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The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the principal maker of monetary policy in the United
States. The main instrument of monetary policy is the target federal funds rate, which is de facto the base
interest rate of the US economy. The FOMC meets around eight times a year to discuss the economic
outlook and decide on this metric. Throughout most of its history, the Fed has been opaque about how it
decides on monetary policy, but in recent years it has adopted a more transparent disclosure policy. For each
FOMC meeting, it currently releases a brief statement immediately after the meeting ends summarizing the
economic outlook and target federal funds rate it will be implementing. Three weeks later, it releases the
full minutes of the meeting. This paper investigates if and how the release of the statement and the release
of the minutes impacts market volatility in the US equities market and the market for the federal funds rate




The Federal Reserve System (colloquially known as the Fed, and referred to as such for the rest of the
paper) is the central bank of the US and serves the economy through two key objectives established by
Congress: maximizing employment and controlling inflation. It makes monetary policy through the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), which meets periodically throughout the year to discuss the outlook of
the economy and decide on key policy actions. The federal funds rate is the rate that banks lend to each
other overnight to satisfy the Fed’s reserve requirements. Although the Fed does not have direct control over
this rate, which is o cially determined by the market, it can influence it significantly to be within a desired
target range through open market operations, or the buying and selling of United States Treasury Securities.
In times of economic expansion, the Fed will try to raise the fed fund rate to keep inflation in check by selling
securities, and in times of recession, the Fed will buy securities, lowering the fed funds rate. The fed funds
rate is also colloquially known as the interest rate, since it serves as the base rate that determines the level
of all other interest rates in the US economy.
Since the FOMC meetings determine such key policy actions, naturally, the detail and outcomes of these
meetings provide important information to market participants as they trade securities in the markets.
Traditionally, the Fed has been a highly opaque institution. Since it is not o cially a government agency (to
minimize political intervention in the economy), it has not been required to publicly disclose its practices like
normal government bodies. For many years, it only released the minutes of the last meeting on the day of
the current meeting, which makes the disclosure largely of historic relevance, as the policy e↵ect has already
been experienced by the market. Over the years, however, the Fed has adopted an increasingly transparent
outlook on its disclosure practices. In the past twenty years, it has started releasing brief statements on the
days of meetings summarizing the policy action decided on in the current meeting. While the content of
the statement has greatly changed since it was first introduced, it has become more complex throughout the
years. In its current form, the one used throughout the sample I studied, it is essentially a press release that
briefly summarizes the Fed’s outlook on the current economy and the target rate the Fed aims to achieve
in the upcoming months. The Fed also shortened the lag between the meeting and the release of the full
minutes from after the next FOMC meeting to only a delay of 3 weeks after the current meeting.
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My paper seeks to examine whether the release of these documents has an e↵ect on average stock market
volatility and the average volatility in the market for the federal fund rates (also referred to as ”fed fund
rates”), and compare which document has a greater e↵ect on average market volatility in a series of di↵erent
timespans.
In the following sections, I study the behavior of volatility in the United States equities market as a
consequence of FOMC actions, such as on FOMC meeting days when the FOMC meeting statement is
released, and on FOMC minutes release days, which are three weeks after the meeting. Using a methodology
similar to Rosa (2013) and Kohn and Sack (2003), I analyze the separate e↵ects on volatility in the equity
market and fed funds rate market on meeting days and minutes release days. Then, I compare the e↵ect
of FOMC statement releases with that of the FOMC minutes release. The timeframes I analyze over are:
overall sample (2007-2014), over each separate year, and over two groups labelled crisis (2007-2010) and
recovery (2011-2014). I do this to see whether overall trends are replicated, or di↵er, in a smaller time frame
and under di↵erent market psychological conditions. Finally, I analyze whether these events are significant
predictors of changes in volatility, and provide a data-supported theory of how volatility trends changed
from the crisis years to the recovery years. I also provide historical background on the actual content of the
FOMC releases to better explain the statistical results presented.
The rest of my paper is organized as follows: Section 3 is a review of relevant literature, Section 4 provides
a description of the data and methodology, and Section 5 provides a discussion of the results presented as a
series of questions that I answer. I summarize my findings and conclude in Section 6.
3 Review of Literature
Significant research has been conducted to measure the e↵ect of FOMC communications on market volatility.
The 2003 study by Kohn and Sack investigated the e↵ect of three types of Fed communication: FOMC
statements, the Chairman’s Congressional Testimony, and the Chairman’s major speeches on asset prices
and interest rates. Their sample was from the period January 3, 1989 to April 7, 2003 under Greenspan.
During this period, the content in the FOMC statements changed gradually as the Fed adopted a more
transparent communications policy, from intermittent releases in 1989-1993, to including a brief description
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of the policy rationale in 1994-1998 to including a more nuanced risk assessment from 1999 until the end of
the study. The assets they studied are the federal funds futures rate expiring 3 months ahead, eurodollar
futures rates expiring 2 quarters and 4 quarters ahead, 2 year and 10 year Treasury yields, 1 year Treasury
forward rates ending 1-4 years ahead, the S&P 500 index, and the forex value of the dollar. Using regression
analysis on asset price returns, they investigate whether these forms of communication have had any e↵ects
on various asset prices that are independent of the e↵ects of the policy actions they announced. They found
that the method of communication of the FOMC statements had a significant influence on asset prices,
especially short term and intermediate term interest rates, even after controlling for the actual change in the
interest rate. After a comparison of the increase in variance of a given asset price attributed to the statement
to that induced directly by the realized policy itself, it was found that short term rates were more directly
influenced by policy actions, while long term rates were more directly influenced by policy statements. So in
the long run, what the Fed says is even more important than what the Fed actually does at the moment. In
my study, I examine the federal funds rate and the S&P 500 Index, and use regression analysis to determine
if the minutes and the statements are significant predictors of asset price volatility, instead of asset price
returns.
The Bomfirm (2003) study shows a trend of US stock prices being influenced by macroeconomic news
conveyed by FOMC decisions on the target fed funds rate. The sample he studies is from 1989-1998. The
relationship between monetary policy and daily stock market volatility is examined from two perspectives:
days around regularly scheduled FOMC meetings, and days of actual policy decisions. This is because before
1994, there was a one-day lag between the decision (the size and type of open market operation conducted,
usually in the afternoon right before trading ends) and the announcement, or the market reaction the
following day. When examining from the perspective of the days of FOMC meetings, they find statistical
evidence that the existence of regularly scheduled policy meetings a↵ects stock market volatility, and the
hypothesis of no FOMC meeting day e↵ects across the entire 1989-1998 sample can be rejected with 1%
significance. When examining from the the day of actual policy decision, they find evidence that the policy
decisions increase volatility regardless of whether they were announced on regularly scheduled meeting days.
They find that conditional volatility is about 40% above typical levels on days of FOMC decisions. In fact,
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a restricted analysis of only the days of surprise announcements nearly doubles the conditional volatility
levels, and the hypothesis of no FOMC meeting day e↵ects on announced/unannounced decision days can
be rejected with 1% significance. They also found that positive surprises (higher than expected value of fed
funds rate) tend to have a larger e↵ect on volatility than negative surprises, thus the e↵ect of policy news
is asymmetric, agreeing with the leverage and volatility-feedback hypotheses. They find that previous day
volatility tends to be muted in anticipation of the policy news, while a surprise increase in the fed funds
rate at a meeting increase market volatility to unusually high levels. In summary, this paper shows that
monetary announcements are an important source of short-run volatility in the stock market. Based on this
paper, I hypothesize that meeting days should have significantly higher market volatility levels than control
days.
The 2011 study by Farka and Fleissig analyzes a sample period from May 1999 to December 2007. They
use an indicator variable that captures the information content in the statements. Their results show that
both an unanticipated change in the interest rate and policy statements have a significant impact on the
average level of asset prices and asset price volatility. They find that the volatility trend follows a “tent”
like pattern, where volatility is unusually low in anticipation of the announcement, peaking right after the
information is introduced, and then returning to a lower stable state after the information has been priced
in the markets. They also find that FOMC statements have a more visible impact on stock returns and
intermediate and long term bond yields, while the short term yield market (the federal funds rate market)
is mostly a↵ect by the target federal funds rate decisions. They also find that since the FOMC revised the
wording of the statement in 2003 to be more forward looking, this increased transparency and has led to
reduced volatility associated with the federal funds rate decision on meeting days. My study shows that the
increased transparency of FOMC regarding the federal funds rate led to lower volatility on meeting days for
the security BIL, which proxies the federal funds market.
In a 2014 article by Murillo and Shell, the authors noted that Fed statements have grown in complexity
in recent years due to the Feds use of unconventional monetary policy, and suggested that the volatility
attributed to its release in the markets may be caused by market participants’ confusion and lack of back-
ground about these new tools. They used the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level index to measure the readability
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of the statements based on education grade levels. They find that in the early 1990s, the statements ranged
from 50-200 words and were comprehensible by high school students. Then in the 2000s until the end of
Greenspan’s tenure, they averaged around 210 words and were written at the reading level of a college sopho-
more. During Bernanke and Yellen’s regimes, the length grew to over 800 words and readers were expected
to have a graduate level education to be able to understand them fully. This study warns of the fallacy of
associating greater transparency with reduced complexity.
I also examine several papers by Carlo Rosa, senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The paper that I drew most inspiration from is his 2013 publication. In this paper he examines the e↵ect of
FOMC Minutes from January 2005 to March 2011 on a variety of asset prices in a shortened time window.
He uses a dataset of 5 minute returns and computes the standard deviations of these returns. After statistical
testing, he finds that the release of the minutes significantly a↵ect the price volatility of U.S. assets. I also
use a similar methodology to organize my data and also examine my data from a shortened time window.
In Rosa’s 2011 paper, he examines the stock market reaction to central bank communication in real time.
Using a high frequency event study analysis on the Dow Jones Industrial Index, NASDAQ 100, S&P 500 and
the VIX volatility index, he shows that, in a sample from 1999 to 2010, FOMC policy communications and
policy actions have a significant impact on volatility of several US stock indices, and that individual stock
prices take around 1 hour to fully incorporate the news before reaching a new price equilibrium, while equity
indices tend to absorb the e↵ects of the news within 40 minutes from the time of release. I also include
his 2010 paper, which studies the high-frequency response of exchange rates to monetary policy actions and
statements for reference into other types of securities besides equities. This paper examines the e↵ect of
FOMC statements on the exchange rate of the USD with 5 currencies: the Euro, Canadian dollar, British
pound, Swiss franc, and Japanese Yen. He finds that the release of the FOMC statement and the actual
policy decision highly impact these exchange rates.
Finally, I examine a 2013 study by Jubinski and Tomljanovich examining FOMCminutes from an intraday
perspective using individual equity volatility and returns. This paper analyzes a shorter time span of one
year, from 2006-2007, but instead of analyzing asset prices from an aggregate index, they create their own
index based on the securities of 2832 firms. They also find evidence that volatility is lower before 2PM than
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after 2PM on minutes-release days, and that volatility is higher on release days relative to a set of control
days taken one week before each release date. Similar to this paper, and the Rosa (2013) paper, I use a set
of control days taken one week before and one week after each meeting and minutes release day and I seek
to verify if their findings are replicated in my sample period.
Building on the existing literature, my paper studies a more recent period of time, dating from May 2007
to December 2014, which chronicles a very tumultuous time in American economic and financial history.
The financial crisis from 2007-2009 was the worst since the Great Depression. This period, and the ensuing
recession and recovery make for a very interesting analysis, and I seek to determine if the results of the earlier
literature still stand. Using the methodology inspired by earlier studies, my paper aims to use the data to
determine if, and how volatility behavior changes throughout the sample through a set of di↵erent timeframes,
provide a comparison of volatility levels on minutes release days with that of the FOMC meeting/statement
release days, and investigate whether the meetings and minutes are significant predictors of market volatility.
4 Hypothesis
Based on reviewing the previous studies, for my analysis in section 6, I expect to see meeting days correspond
to higher levels of average volatility when compared to a set of non-event control days. I also expect to see
minutes release days induce higher levels of average volatility than a set of control days. When looking at
intraday volatility, the di↵erence of volatility before and after 2PM, I expect the di↵erence on meeting and
minutes days to be significantly larger than the di↵erence their respective control days control days. When
comparing which event release day induces higher intraday volatility, I expect the meeting day to prevail
over minutes release day. Finally, when I examine whether how well the event of a meeting day or minutes
day predicts market volatility, I expect a model that includes meeting day and minutes day as indicator
variables to be more significant than a model without these predictors.
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5 Data and Methodology
For the purpose of my analysis, I use the securities SPY and BIL as proxies for the behavior of the US
equity market and fed funds market, respectively. SPY is the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust, an exchange
traded fund that tracks the S&P 500, a stock market index based on 500 companies with the largest market
capitalizations on the NYSE or NASDAQ. The movement of the S&P stock index is usually quite similar to
the movement of the entire US stock market, so how the price of SPY changes is a good indicator of how
price levels in the overall stock market change.
The federal funds rate data was not readily accessible to me, so I used BIL, the SPDR Bloomberg Barclays
1-3 Month T-Bill ETF, as a proxy. It tracks the 1-3 Month T-Bill index. Since short term T-Bill yields are
closely and positively correlated with movements federal funds rates, the volatility of BIL can be used as a
proxy for the volatility of the federal funds rate. Since the first day BIL started trading was May 30, 2007,
this is the day my sample starts. The latest year I have access to from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS) is 2014, which is where my sample ends. So, the dates of my sample are from May 30, 2007 to
December 31, 2014. There were 121 meeting days and 80 minutes release dates over the sample.
The formal definition of the primary metric I study, market volatility, is the standard deviation of 1
minute returns: s
⌃Ni=1(ri   r̄)2
N   1 (1)
where ri is the individual 1-minute return of the security, r̄ is the sample mean return of the security, and
N is the number of observations. I calculate this metric for SPY and BIL. To create my dataset, I use high
frequency, tick by tick data that records all transactions on an asset, with more than one entry per second.
I retrieve the data for SPY and BIL from the WRDS database. I use R’s collection of data cleaning and
statistical analysis packages to process the data and conduct hypothesis testing and regression analysis.
To reduce the noise, or random fluctuations that are inherent in high frequency data, I aggregate the
original, tick by tick time series into a minute by minute time series. The data cleaning and aggregation
process includes converting the original dates used into a format that other functions can process, removing
the times that were not part of the time interval considered(keeping only entries from 12:00PM to 4:00PM),
and computing summary statistics for minute by minute intervals, such as an approximate minute return,
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which will be used to calculate the volatility, by computing the return between each tick, and summing these
returns up together over each 1 minute interval.
I have included the summary statistics for SPY and BIL returns below. As a check, I test for normality
of returns. I have included the Jarque-Bera test for normality results and summary statistics for the returns
in the Appendix, Item 1. The extremely low p-values indicate that the returns of SPY and BIL are not
normally distributed, which is consistent with the observation in Rosa (2013).
Now, my entire dataset consists of 1-minute returns of the securities SPY and BIL recorded for each
minute of the event window, over the years 2007-2014. After eliminating the values outside of the event
window I am considering, from 12:00PM to 4:00PM, I proceed to group my data by hour and minute. I do
this with the dplyr data analysis package in R, which has a function that allows me to sort and work with
the data in groups. After applying this function, my data would now be sorted into the groups 12:00PM,
12:01PM and 12:02PM, and so on, until 3:59PM. So there would be 60 minutes * 4 hours = 240 groups that
all my data would be sorted into. I’ll refer to them as minute-groups for clarity, because there is one for each
minute of the event window. So now, each minute-group will consist of the returns of BIL and SPY in that
minute for each of the days in the sample. Continuing with our example, for the minute group 12:01PM,
one row would contain the returns of BIL and SPY on August 19, 2008 (at 12:01PM), and the following row
would contain the returns of BIL and SPY on August 20, 2008 (at 12:01PM). I then proceed to separately
calculate the sample standard deviation of the returns of BIL and the returns of SPY with Equation 1 above,
for each minute group. I end up with a dataset of 240 standard deviations, one for each minute group. This
method works best when there are a large number of observations for each minute-group.
For more qualitative analysis, I look online to find articles in the CNN news series Market Summary and
other intraday updates provided by CNN Money. These articles are written on days I identified as having
high average volatility levels. Based on these articles, I determine the story behind the volatility trend, or
discover the reason why a particular day is an outlier, as explained in the next section.
In order to provide a control set for comparison purposes, I follow the methodology of Rosa (2013) and
Jubinski and Tomljanovich (2013) and sample from a subset of days one week before and one week after
each meeting day as proxies for normal, non-event days. This is done to isolate the e↵ects of the meeting on
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the meeting days as best as possible, and minimize the e↵ect of non-FOMC events on non-meeting days. To
illustrate our sampling criteria, if a meeting occured on June 12, 2007, control dates would be June 5, 2007
and June 19, 2007.
5.1 Investigating and Identifying Outliers
Any dataset with influential outliers would give biased and inaccurate results upon analysis, so I employ the
common IQR method to identify and eliminate extreme points in the 1 minute returns of SPY and BIL. I
define an outlier as any return that lies more than 3 times the length of the interquartile range.
So an outlier is any return that is outside the range:
(Q
1
  3 ⇤ IQR,Q
3
+ 3IQR)
A summary of the original SPY returns with outliers showed:
> summary(MasterData12to4PMwithOutliers$RET.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-0.0288 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0189 0.0002 2174.0000




= 0.0004. Based on the criteria above, I consider any 1-minute
return outside of the range ( .0014, .0014), or with an absolute value greater than or equal to .14% to be an
outlier for SPY.
A summary of the original BIL returns with outliers showed:
> summary(MasterData12to4PMwithOutliers$RET.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-2.183e-02 -4.366e-05 0.000e+00 1.240e-07 4.368e-05 2.231e-02




= .00008734. Hence I consider any 1-minute return for BIL outside of the
range (.00031, .00031), or with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.031% to be an outlier for BIL.
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I then investigate the reasons some extremely large outliers appear in the original dataset by researching
journal articles for significant events around these dates and times.
A preliminary analysis of abnormally large 1 minute returns of BIL shows one day with large price
volatility: October 3, 2007. The one minute returns for BIL fluctuated in the late afternoon from 2:30-
4:00PM with a jump of -2% between 2:38-39PM, a jump of 2% between 2:43-2:44PM, a jump of -2% again
between 2:44-2:45PM, and ended with a final jump of 2% at 3:58-3:59PM. I have not found a significant
explanation for the large deviation, since it is not a day of meeting and no immediate Fed news was released
during this time. The markets may be simply reacting to interest rate volatility occuring around this time
due to rising rates of subprime mortgage defaults.
A preliminary survey of abnormally large 1 minute returns of SPY shows the following days with cor-
responding returns: June 25, 2009 at 3:46-3:47PM, the price went up around 1088 times or 108800%, and
at 3:54-3:55PM, the price went up around 2174 times or 217400%, August 10, 2007 at 12:35-12:36PM, the
price more than doubled (increased by 213%), May 6, 2010, at 2:44-45PM the price fluctuated by 28%, 8%,
22%, 60%, over each of the minute intervals from 2:45-2:50PM, October 16, 2008, at 3:54-3:55PM, the price
fluctuated by 20%, 42%, 50%, 38%, and 49%, in the last minutes of the trading day, November 7, 2008, at
3:25-3:26PM, a jump of 30% occured, and December 18, 2014, at 3:58-3:59PM a jump of 10% occured.
I then investigate whether any significant events occured on those days to warrant the large jumps in
volatility. I found that June 25 was not a meeting day, and no significant news occured, although there was
a rally in stock prices that day because investors felt shares in several industries were undervalued after a
period of falling prices. I also noted that June is the month of the annual Russell Index Rebalance, giving a
reason for some degree of abnormal price movements. However, neither of these reasons is enough to warrant
the huge return, so I suspect that the fluctuation was due to an entry error.
For August 10, 2007, I first noted it was a meeting day. Further reading showed that on this day, the
Federal Reserve made its discount window ready to provide emergency liquidity as many credit institutions
were failing because of the subprime mortgage crisis, and the Dow Jones index closed down 0.2%, a sign of
the pessimism in the markets. Some news articles published around the time of the large volatility fluctuation
talked of market uncertainty regarding housing prices and the collapse of many subprime mortgage lenders.
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For May 6, 2010, market reports showed it is the day of the May 6th flash crash, where an erroneous
trade by a mutual fund sparked massive sell-o↵s in blue-chip stocks, the shares of large and well regarded
companies. This occured around 2:45PM, the time these abnormal returns were observed. Hence the event
is also known as the “Crash of 2:45”. However, once the error was apparent, markets were able to quickly
recover those losses, thus explaining the large price volatilities observed around those times.
For October 16, 2008, I noted it was not a meeting day, but the stock market saw large price fluctuations as
it was near the height of the crisis, and the government started taking aggressive action (after the unexpected
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008). On this day in particular, the lowest oil prices this
year prompted investors to jump back into the equities market, scooping up many shares at very low prices,
which led to large fluctuations in price as demand changed.
On November 7, 2008 a stock rally sparked great movement in prices. Although it was not a meeting
day, investors started buying what they felt were undervalued stocks. After several waves of bad news
early in the day: an abysmal job report of 10 straight months of job losses, negative investor sentiment
about the announcement of Barack Obama’s presidential victory, and a large quarter loss reported for
influential company General Motors, they felt prices were already at a low. The rush to buy caused large
price movements. A piece of positive news that also may have helped was that then president-elect Obama
gave an afternoon conference where he promised a stimulus package upon taking o ce. Together, the weak
economic data and investors’ hope of policy action sparked by Obama’s conference were enough to change
the price a lot in a short period of time, explaining the high volatility recorded in the afternoon.
Although December 18, 2014 was itself not a meeting day, it was the day after the December 17th FOMC
meeting. The Dow Jones index was at the highest point since 2011 and the S&P also had the biggest increase
since the beginning of 2013. The markets reacted positively to the Fed’s annoucement that it will not raise
rates until mid 2015. It was largely regarded as the best trading day in 2014.
In summary, I have excluded from my study outliers from the following days: August 10, 2007, October
3, 2007, October 16, 2008, November 7, 2008, June 25, 2009, May 6, 2010, and December 18, 2014.
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6 Results: Analysis of Volatility
6.1 Background of general volatilty trend throughout the sample
Figure 1 below shows the average 1 minute price volatility of SPY and BIL for the event window from 12PM
to 4PM, calculated for the entire sample. I derived the volatility metrics using the method in Section 4.
Figure 1: Average 1 Minute Price Volatility of SPY and BIL for the event window from 12PM - 4PM
Without accounting for the e↵ect of a meeting day or minutes release day, it is clear that when considering
the entire sample period of years 2007-2014, the graphs show that the volatility of the proxy security for the
equity market, SPY, behaves di↵erently from the volatility of the proxy security for the federal funds rate,
BIL. SPY volatility levels tend to increase as each trading day progresses towards the end, from noon to
afternoon. This may be due to the fast paced and global nature of the equities market. Participants may
be anticipating outcomes of economic reports that are released after market hours, and also market events
that occur abroad in other time zones. An operational reason for this trend is that day traders, who do not
hold shares overnight, need to close their daily positions latest at 4PM.
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However, BIL volatility levels tend to fluctuate around a constant mean, and tend to level o↵ as the
trading day ends, indicating it is mainly influenced by domestic events in the US. The lack of a clear up
or down trend agrees with my expectations, because under normal circumstances, the federal funds rate
would have little reason to experience large fluctuations unless the FOMC announces a new target federal
funds rate, which only occurs during FOMC meetings. Also, due to the e↵ects of the financial crisis, over
most of the sample period, from December 2008 to December 2014, interest rates close to zero prevailed,
which is highly unusual considering past history. Therefore, the limited number of days for the target rate
to move, and the bad economic conditions driving rates to the lower bound are factors that lead to a lack to
a particular trend in the volatility of BIL. Visually the peaks of volatility appear larger than SPY, but this
is because the BIL graph’s volatility is plotted on a smaller scale, magnifying even small movements. The
spikes indicate some level of volatility visibly di↵erent from the surrounding levels, yet not abnormal enough
to be eliminated as outliers. This can be attributed to noise, the phenomenon of random variations in data
measured at smaller intervals, such as in the 1-minute returns I use. Previous studies used larger intervals,
such as a 5-minute, hourly, or even daily return.
Although the above graphs show some general, long term trends that persist throughout the sample
period, shorter term trends persisting for a few years or even one year can be missed if I only consider
the volatility across the entire sample. To detect any shorter term trends in volatility, I will examine in
later sections volatility under smaller time periods: over each individual year of the sample, and over two
subsamples: crisis and recovery years.
6.2 Do meeting days have significantly di↵erent volatility than non meeting
days?
I separate my sample into meeting and non-meeting days via an indicator variable and examine if the volatility
of SPY and BIL returns is di↵erent in the context of meeting vs non-meeting days. Because the number
of non-meeting days far outnumbers the number of meeting days, and the volatility may be influenced by
many other external factors, I get control dates via the methodology introduced in the previous section.
Figure 2 shows the average volatility of SPY and BIL during the entire sample period when I di↵erentiate
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between meeting and non-meeting days. The red lines denote volatility over meeting days, while the blue
line denotes volatility over control days. For SPY, an upward trend in volatility appears over time. It is
also evident that volatility appears to be higher on meeting days, denoted by the red line, as opposed to
control days, denoted by the blue line. This visually confirms my hypothesis that through the timeframe of
the entire sample, the volatility on meeting days is higher than on non-meeting days. However, for BIL the
trend is not obvious.
Figure 2: Average volatility of SPY and BIL during entire sample period
I use hypothesis testing to confirm for sure whether the average volatility is significantly di↵erent on
meeting days than control days. I test the following alternative hypothesis:
Ha : µVol, Meeting 6= µVol, Control
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Table 1 below shows that a two sided t-test for the di↵erence of average volatility confirms that average
volatility is significantly di↵erent on meeting days than control days. The positive test statistic of SPY
shows that average volatility on meeting days is in fact greater than on non-meeting days. However for BIL,
the negative test statistic shows that the average volatility on meeting days is actually less than on control
days. Further testing showed that BIL volatility is actually significantly less on control days. This is an
interesting deviation from previous literature, where evidence mostly suggest larger market movements on
meeting days, but a plausible explanation can be the unusually high intraday volatility observed during the
height of the financial crisis, active FOMC policymaking on non-scheduled meetings, as well as the unusually
long term period of zero interest rates and transparent communication. I will examine smaller timeframes
shortly. These observations statistically confirm my hypothesis that the volatility for SPY on FOMC meeting
days is significantly di↵erent than the volatility on control days due to the introduction of market-moving
information provided by the meeting statements. For R output and other relevant statistics, please refer to
Appendix Item 2.
Table 1: T-test Results for Ha : µVol, Meeting 6= µVol, Control
Security T-stat P-value
SPY 3.5124 0.0005085 *
BIL -5.6044 5.07e-08 *
Although it is evident that when considering the timeframe of the entire sample, the volatility on meeting
days is significantly di↵erent than on non-meeting days, I would like to examine whether this trend persists
throughout each individual year, or a group of years. Thus, I examine the volatility in each separate year in
my sample: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, and in two subsamples: crisis (2007-2010)
and recovery (2011-2014).
Table 2 below shows the results of the test of significance of the di↵erence in average volatility over all
the years. As a general observation, in the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, market volatility was higher, on
average, on control days than on meeting days. This suggests that the events of the financial crisis brought
about significant volatility in daily trading, and the meetings of the FOMC were but just one event investors
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needed to watch out for. It may also signify that the FOMC has become more transparent than earlier years,
allowing market participants to predict the target rate from past statements and adjust market prices before
the actual meeting. As the economy eventually recovered from the crisis, more volatility can be observed,
especially in the equity market, on meeting days. Table 3 confirms this observation using the data.
On a technical note, for the years of my sample from 2007 to 2010, I encountered the issue of having some
undefined volatility metrics. This is caused by some time intervals (a specific minute-group) having only 1
entry recorded in the sample. For example, only 1 date may have been observed in minute-group 3:14PM.
Because the standard deviation of a sample of 1 is undefined, there were gaps in my graph that obscured some
trends. To make the trends clearer, I fix this issue by setting the times with undefined standard deviations
to having standard deviations equal to 0, which would connect the gaps. This is a common approach I read
about in online statistics forums. For other calculations, I used the original dataset with NA values.
Figures 3 and 4 show the FOMC volatility graphs across the di↵erent years. I will now go over the results
of Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 3 and 4 and discuss some key events a↵ecting market volatility in each of the
years of our sample to improve our understanding of the annual volatility trends.
I note that the 2007 graph is sparser than the graphs of the following years because the sample starts
on May 30, 2007, the day the BIL security began trading on the market, and ends on December 31 2007.
After mid 2007, as the subprime mortgage market collapsed and the e↵ects of the credit crisis were just
beginning to unfold, there was uncertainty whether the Federal Reserve will lower rates or inject reserves to
help the banking system. The results of Table 2 show that for SPY, volatility on meeting days in the equity
markets was less than control days, while for BIL, volatility on meeting days was not significantly di↵erent
from volatility on control days. This reflect a general uncertainty about interest rates in the beginning of
the crisis, since the FOMC still had room to move the relatively high rate at this time. The results for 2007
may not be as strong as the results for the following years because of the smaller dataset.
From this graph, it is evident that there is a di↵erence in trend from the earlier years to the later years.
Although volatility during meeting days is surprisingly significantly lower than non-meeting days during the
earlier years, during the later years, volatility is reverts to the trend observed in previous literature of being
higher on meeting days than non meeting days.
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Table 2: Two tailed T-test for di↵erence in average volatility of SPY and BIL results by year
Significant results (↵ = 10% ) denoted *
Security Ha : µMeeting 6= µControl ? T-stat P-value
SPY 2007 Yes -2.7948 0.007984 *
BIL 2007 No 0.54865 0.5873
SPY 2008 Yes -2.3478 0.01966 *
BIL 2008 Yes -2.7924 0.005628 *
SPY 2009 Yes -2.2709 0.02367 *
BIL 2009 No -0.67106 0.5026
SPY 2010 No -0.38912 0.6974
BIL 2010 Yes -1.8802 0.06078 *
SPY 2011 Yes 3.2924 0.001078 *
BIL 2011 No -0.65854 0.5106
SPY 2012 Yes 5.1657 3.844e-07 *
BIL 2012 Yes -4.4666 1.039e-05 *
SPY 2013 Yes 4.1138 4.771e-05 *
BIL 2013 Yes -5.043 6.594e-07 *
SPY 2014 Yes 6.5477 2.077e-10 *
BIL 2014 Yes -3.5361 0.000453 *
SPY Subsample 1 Yes -1.8609 0.06349 *
BIL Subsample 1 No -0.8394 0.4017
SPY Subsample 2 Yes 7.6059 1.988e-13 *
BIL Subsample 2 Yes -4.6791 3.831e-06 *
For 2008, I note that, as verified by the tests in Table 2, the average annual volatility of SPY and BIL
are both significantly lower on meeting days than control days. Table 3 shows that for SPY and BIL, overall
volatility levels for this year are higher than the sample average. The higher than average market volatility
on control days is a sign of economic uncertainty due to the financial crisis. Many significant events happened
over non-meeting days that had greatly a↵ected the markets, such as the unexpected bankruptcy of large
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financial firm Lehman Brothers and the bailout of AIG. For BIL, the similar average volatilities on FOMC
meeting days vs non-meeting days indicates that investors had trouble predicting the direction of interest
rates that year, on average.
In 2009, as the crisis continued, a similar e↵ect can be seen. Table 2 and Table 3 shows the continuation
of the trend of higher intraday volatility levels on control days than meeting days in the equity markets,
while volatility levels in the federal funds market remained indistinguishable between meeting and control
days. In 2009, the FOMC expanded its use of alternative monetary policy, such as the expansion of the
quantitative easing program, to assist in economic recovery.
In 2010, signs of recovery can be observed, with average volatility in SPY being lower than the previous
two years. However, Table 2 shows that equity markets still experience almost constant levels of volatility
on all days. Although markets in the U.S. were doing better, the European economy, which also influences
the U.S. economy, was greatly a↵ected by the government debt crisis across Eurozone countries. A June 23
FOMC meeting also warned of a slower pace of economic recovery due to this event, and the high volatility
may have been due to worries about international spillover e↵ects. BIL volatility remained higher on non-
meeting days because it was clear interest rates would not be raised in the near future since the economy
was still quite weak, and the zero interest rate policy gave no room for the FOMC to move it any lower.
In 2011, the e↵ects of the continuation of quantitative easing can be observed, and economic data shows
signs of a modest recovery. For the first time since the crisis, equity markets are shown to place more
importance in information released on FOMC meeting days. The fact that this trend can be detected is
a sign of lower intraday volatility and the restoration of normal market conditions. An important piece of
news that may have sped up recovery is a strongly dovish (accommodating) FOMC statement released on
the meeting day August 9th 2011 announcing that the committee would keep interest rates low until mid
2013. This, along with a similar statement released in the following year, would greatly reduce interest rate
uncertainty for the remainder of the sample period.
For 2012, Table 2 indicates the continued recovery of the economy. A continuation of the pre-crisis results
from the previous year can be seen, as described in earlier literature. Average volatility on meeting days for
the equities market is now significantly higher than on control days, while the federal funds market remains
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relatively calm on meeting days. This may be due to continued dovish FOMC statements protecting the
equity market. On September 13, 2012, the FOMC announced a 3rd round of quantitative easing, and also
assured investors of its intention to keep rates near 0 until 2015. Both would have an e↵ect on keeping
volatility for SPY and BIL low for control days for the remainder of the year.
For 2013, a prevalent question market participants watched out for during meeting days was when, and
how, the quantitative easing program was going to end. The equity market benefited from the artificially
lowered interest rates brought about by quantitative easing, but investors feared stocks prices would plummet
again when the rates go back up after the program ends. Thus, there was uncertainty when the FOMC
revealed its plan for tapering, or gradually discontinuing, their stimulative programs. BIL prices fluctuated
little, indicating investor confidence in the FOMC statement of the previous year saying that rates would be
low until 2015.
For 2014, a continuation of the trend from the prior year can be observed. The dataset shows that
the highest volatility spikes for SPY on meeting days occured at 2:00PM and at 2:32PM for control days.
The 2:00PM spike during the meeting can be attributed to a stock price rally after the December 17, 2014
meeting, in which the Fed announced that it would only gradually increase rates after the first two meetings
of 2015. This assured investors that the market would remain protected by policy for the short term.
Here, it is evident that the double tailed test revealed an interesting contrasting trend in volatility. In earlier
years, there is a significant di↵erence in volatility between meeting and control days, and the negative T-
statistics show that volatility on meeting days is actually less than on control days for most years. This is
more evidence that the events of the financial crisis proved to be more disruptive to markets than regularly
scheduled FOMC policy meetings, and the reaction to the unanticipated daily events of the crisis masked
the e↵ects of the meetings. For BIL, in the earlier years, 2008 was a significant year, because of the large
fluctuations in interest rate, which decreased from around 5% to 0%. As the crisis resolved itself, a general
trend of FOMC events having larger e↵ects in the markets in the later years can be observed. Also, due
to the clearly dovish stance taken during the recovery period, when the Fed assured long periods of zero
interest rate policy, the federal funds market remained unusually stable on meeting days during the entire
sample period.
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Table 3: Comparison of volatility levels each year
Year and Security and Meeting/Control Average Volatility 2007-2014 Average Volatility
SPY 2007 Meeting 0.00020 0.0003836
SPY 2007 Control 0.00041 0.0003618
BIL 2007 Meeting 0.00008 1.053e-04
BIL 2007 Control 0.00007 0.0001100
SPY 2008 Meeting 0.00048 0.0003836
SPY 2008 Control 0.000556 0.0003618
BIL 2008 Meeting 0.00009 1.053e-04
BIL 2008 Control 0.000107 0.0001100
SPY 2009 Meeting 0.000444 0.0003836
SPY 2009 Control 0.0004785 0.0003618
BIL 2009 Meeting 0.000115 1.053e-04
BIL 2009 Control 1.171e-04 0.0001100
SPY 2010 Meeting 0.000334 0.0003836
SPY 2010 Control 3.404e-04 0.0003618
BIL 2010 Meeting 0.000100 1.053e-04
BIL 2010 Control 1.072e-04 0.0001100
SPY 2011 Meeting 0.0004530 0.0003836
SPY 2011 Control 4.067e-04 0.0003618
BIL 2011 Meeting 0.0001034 1.053e-04
BIL 2011 Control 1.055e-04 0.0001100
SPY 2012 Meeting 3.019e-04 0.0003836
SPY 2012 Control 0.0002464 0.0003618
BIL 2012 Meeting 8.248e-05 1.053e-04
BIL 2012 Control 9.437e-05 0.0001100
SPY 2013 Meeting 2.518e-04 0.0003836
SPY 2013 Control 2.154e-04 0.0003618
BIL 2013 Meeting 9.011e-05 1.053e-04
BIL 2013 Control 1.014e-04 0.0001100
SPY 2014 Meeting 3.143e-04 0.0003836
SPY 2014 Control 2.481e-04 0.0003618
BIL 2014 Meeting 1.049e-04 1.053e-04
BIL 2014 Control 1.129e-04 0.0001100
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Figure 3: Annual FOMC Volatility on Meeting Days across the years 2007-2010.
Red = Meeting, Blue = Non-Meeting
24
Figure 4: Annual FOMC Volatility on Meeting Days across the years 2011-2014.
Red = Meeting, Blue = Non-Meeting
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6.3 Do meeting days experience a larger change in volatility before and after
2PM than on control days?
I then analyze the volatility in terms of before and after the release of the statement, which are usually
published around 2PM on meeting days, in terms of control days versus meeting days.
I divide my data of volatility on meeting days and control days into pre-2PM and post-2PM and investigate
whether the change in average volatility from before 2PM to after 2PM is greater than the change in average
volatility from before 2PM to after 2PM on control days. To be able to capture more trends, I test the two
tailed alternative hypothesis:
Ha = µVol,Meeting, post2PM   µVol,Meeting,pre2PM 6= µVol, Control, post2PM   µVol, Control, pre2PM
I first test this hypothesis for the overall sample, and then for each of the years of my sample and across
subsamples. In Table 4 below, I present the results for each of the years of the sample and discuss some
significant observations. The complete printout of the test results is in the Appendix, Item 4.
For the overall sample, I found the di↵erence in volatility before and after 2PM to be indeed significantly
greater on meeting days than control days for both BIL and SPY. However, examining the volatility in
each year, I note that in the most tumultuous crisis years of 2007-2008, the change in volatility on control
days was not significantly di↵erent compared to the change in the volatility on meeting days as the markets
dealt with dramatic events on a frequent basis. This may be also due to the unusual earlier release time
of some statements, such as at 7AM or 8AM, so that investors have already had the chance to price in the
e↵ects into the markets by 2PM. For 2009, the data shows that the change in volatility before and after
2PM is significantly greater on meeting days than on non-meeting days for the equity markets. A possible
interpretation for this behavior is due to the Fed increasing the size of its quantitative easing program that
year. Because quantitative easing has never been implemented before in the United States, investors were
uncertain of the e↵ects of this policy and had trouble predicting its impact. For 2010, again for the equity
markets, the change in volatility is greater on meeting days than non-meeting days.In 2011, I note that
the dovish August FOMC announcement kept the federal funds market relatively stable. In 2012, for BIL,
the change in volatility before and after 2PM is significantly greater on meeting days than on non-meeting
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days. This may be a sign of uncertainty about Europe and interest rates. Although the market was slowly
recovering, investors were worried about the impacts of the European debt crisis on domestic growth and
were not sure if this growth can be sustained without accommodating policies from the Fed. In 2013, as the
economy visibly improved, markets participants were now interested in when, and how, quantitative easing
policies would be tapered. In that year, the continued e↵ects of the strong dovish statement from the FOMC
in December 2012 assured investors that interest rates would not be raised until 2015. In 2013 and 2014,
the e↵ects of this statement can be observed, as BIL volatility levels before and after 2PM did not change
significantly on meeting days when compared to non-meetings days. I provide a discussion of the subsample
results in Section 5.8.
Figure 5 below shows volatility before and after 2PM for BIL and SPY. The orange line denotes volatility
before 2PM on meeting days, red line denotes volatility after 2PM on meeting days, green denotes volatility
before 2PM on control days, and blue denotes after volatility after 2PM on control days.
Figure 5: Volatility for SPY(left) and BIL (right), before and after 2PM on Meeting and Control days
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Table 4: Results for test Ha = µVol,Mpost   µVol,Mpre 6= µVol, Cpost   µVol, Cpre
Year and Security Ha = µVol,Mpost   µVol,Mpre 6= µVol, Cpost   µVol, Cpre T statistic P-value
Overall SPY Yes 11.009 < 2.2e-16 *
Overall BIL Yes 2.5903 0.01062 *
SPY 2007 No -0.91316 0.3626
BIL 2007 No -1.4972 0.1358
SPY 2008 No -0.053723 0.9572
BIL 2008 No -1.0226 0.3075
SPY 2009 Yes 4.1361 5.058e-05 *
BIL 2009 No -0.61497 0.5393
SPY 2010 Yes 4.8756 2.16e-06 *
BIL 2010 No 1.1103 0.2681
SPY 2011 Yes 2.0836 0.03848 *
BIL 2011 No 0.11165 0.9112
SPY 2012 No 0.86362 0.3889
BIL 2012 Yes 3.7409 0.0002404 *
SPY 2013 Yes 8.7514 5.683e-16 *
BIL 2013 No -0.39849 0.6906
SPY 2014 Yes 5.7265 4.244e-08 *
BIL 2014 No -1.4089 0.1604
SPY Subsample 1 Yes 6.4516 7.318e-10 *
BIL Subsample 1 No -0.50125 0.6167
SPY Subsample 2 Yes 6.1498 4.096e-09 *
BIL Subsample 2 No 0.079691 0.9366
6.4 Is volatility higher on minutes release days than control days?
Here, I create a new set of control dates in a methodology similar to above: using as controls the day one
week before and 1 week after the day the minutes are released. This set of controls is di↵erent from the ones
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used in the analysis of meeting days. I test the alternative hypothesis:
Ha : µvol, minutes 6= µvol, control
The table below shows my results throughout the entire sample, with significant results denoted * at
↵ =10%). Overall, I observe for SPY that on release of minutes days, the average market volatility is not
significantly higher than the average market volatility on control days, but for BIL, the average market
volatility during minutes-release days does significantly di↵er from the average market volatility during
control days. The overall sample conclusion for SPY indicates that when considering the entirely of the seven
years, the minutes did not, in general, convey as much information to the equity market. The only years
where SPY exhibited higher than normal volatility on minutes release days was 2012 and 2013, reflecting
market uncertainty about how the beginning of policy tapering and ending of quantitative easing as the
economy recovered. The additional information would have helped the markets understand the FOMC’s
policy intentions better. The overall sample conclusion for BIL shows that minutes release days was, in
general calmer than the surrounding days, with the markets anticipating most of the information released
in the minutes.
Looking at the subsamples, during the years 2007-2010, the high intraday volatility and many unexpected
events during the crisis mutes the e↵ect of the release of FOMC minutes, with the equity markets showing
more volatility on non-minutes release days, while the federal funds markets show constant levels of volatility.
However, for the second subsample, a renewed interest in the minutes in equity markets as the economy
returned to normal conditions can be observed. For BIL, the volatility on minutes release days does not
significantly di↵er from control days, perhaps as a consequence of strong FOMC statements about keeping
interest rates near 0% in the later years of the economic recovery. The below graph plots the volatility of
SPY and BIL separated by control vs meeting days. The red line shows minutes-release day volatility and
the blue line shows control day volatility. This suggests that the minutes are not as significant a document
as the meeting statements, even after the crisis subsided. I investigate this hypothesis in a later section.
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Table 5: Two tailed t-test for di↵erence in average volatility on minutes release days and control days
Security and Year Ha : µvol, minutes 6= µvol, control T-statistic P-value
SPY, overall No 0.49365 0.6218
BIL, overall Yes -3.4309 0.0006604 *
SPY 2007 No -0.9502 0.3425
BIL 2007 No -0.93478 0.3504
SPY 2008 Yes -9.0393 < 2.2e-16 *
BIL 2008 Yes -8.7278 < 2.2e-16 *
SPY 2009 Yes -3.4987 0.0005155 *
BIL 2009 Yes -6.8796 2.065e-11 *
SPY 2010 Yes -3.1925 0.001512 *
BIL 2010 Yes -4.8778 1.493e-06 *
SPY 2011 Yes -6.1551 1.7e-09 *
BIL 2011 Yes -4.9408 1.118e-06 *
SPY 2012 Yes 4.128 4.415e-05 *
BIL 2012 Yes -3.7377 0.0002086 *
SPY 2013 Yes 1.8905 0.05947 *
BIL 2013 Yes -6.541 1.633e-10 *
SPY 2014 Yes -4.391 1.402e-05 *
BIL 2014 Yes 1.7407 0.08255 *
SPY Subsample 1 No -1.178 0.2395
BIL Subsample 1 Yes -4.8112 2.133e-06 *
SPY Subsample 2 Yes 1.6985 0.0902 *
BIL Subsample 2 No -0.8781 0.3804
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Figure 6: Volatility for SPY(left) and BIL (right) on Minutes release and Control Days
6.5 Do minutes days experience a larger change in volatility before and after
2PM than control days?
I then examine if the change in average volatility on minutes release days before and after 2PM is significantly
di↵erent from the change in average volatility on control days at 2PM for SPY and BIL. I examine the data
through the timeframes of overall sample and by subsample, by before and after 2PM. I test the hypothesis:
Ha : µMinutes, post   µMinutes, pre 6= µControl, post   µControl, pre
The table below shows the results. I find that overall, for SPY, the volatility change on minutes days
is significantly di↵erent (and larger) than on control days, particularly for the post-crisis years. The large
positive t-statistics for SPY in the later years indicate that average market volatility after the minutes release
was higher than before the minutes release under more normal market conditions.
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Table 6: Results for Ha : µM, post   µM, pre 6= µC, post   µC, pre
Year and Security Ha : µM, post   µM, pre 6= µC, post   µC, pre T-statistic P-value
SPY, overall Yes 4.8414 2.611e-06 *
BIL, overall No 1.3447 0.1801
SPY 2007 No -0.3202 0.7491
BIL 2007 No -0.39709 0.6917
SPY 2008 No -0.98396 0.3262
BIL 2008 No 0.68778 0.4923
SPY 2009 Yes 2.3572 0.01927 *
BIL 2009 No 0.24654 0.8055
SPY 2010 Yes 2.3276 0.02089 *
BIL 2010 No 0.99169 0.3224
SPY 2011 No 0.22584 0.8215
BIL 2011 No 0.38462 0.7009
SPY 2012 No 1.6136 0.1082
BIL 2012 No 0.42389 0.672
SPY 2013 Yes 6.9882 3.384e-11 *
BIL 2013 Yes 2.5861 0.01031 *
SPY 2014 Yes 5.0465 8.953e-07 *
BIL 2014 No 0.76926 0.4427
SPY subsample 1 Yes 2.7232 0.007006 *
BIL subsample 1 No 1.09 0.2769
SPY subsample 2 Yes 5.5824 7.241e-08 *
BIL subsample 2 No 1.204 0.2299
However, for BIL the e↵ect is much more muted, and this can be attributed to the statement already
clearly announcing the target fed fund rate, the main factor that moves prices in the BIL market. Overall,
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it is evident that under normal market conditions, as the minutes are released, they do exert some influence
on intraday volatility for equity markets by adding some additional details to provide participants with a
more nuanced and accurate understanding of the FOMC’s economic outlook, although during crisis years,
the delayed nature of the release makes the information less relevant than usual.
6.6 Is the change in volatility higher on meeting days than minutes release
days?
Although I have investigated the relationship of volatility on minutes release days and meeting days when
considering the events separately, I now investigate in which of the two FOMC events studied one can
observe a higher change in volatility. My original hypothesis is that since the minutes is a more detailed,
and delayed, explanation of the rationale behind the policy actions the Fed outlined in the statements, the
average change in market volatility on minutes release days ought to be smaller than the average change in
market volatility on the meeting days. However, to capture all possible trends, I test a broader, two tailed
alternative hypothesis:
Ha : µVol,Meeting,post2PM   µVol, Meeting,pre2PM 6= µVol, Minutes,post2PM   µVol, Minutes,pre2PM
Table 7 shows the results at ↵ = 10% (denoted with *). I find that, for the timeframe of the entire
sample, the change in intraday volatility on minutes days in the federal funds market is not significantly
di↵erent from the change in volatility on meetings dates. However, for the equities market, I observe intraday
volatility on meeting days to be higher than on minutes release days, especially during the crisis years. This
observation suggests that both documents influence the markets similarly on the days they are released,
while for equities markets during the crisis years, the meeting statements proved to be a bit more useful,
probably because of the timely information they conveyed. However, this trend did not persist uniformly
throughout the entire sample. A notable exception is in 2013, when the minutes release days were actually
observed to have higher intraday volatility than meeting days. This may be the e↵ect of a general concern
with tapering, which caused both the equity and federal funds rate markets to consult the minutes for more
information, and the delay did not eliminate the usefulness of a more detailed discussion of tapering policies.
The table conveys that the statement and minutes ought to be equally important during normal market
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conditions, since they serve di↵erent purposes, although the usefulness of the minutes can be diminished in
an abnormally fast paced market due to the time lag. In Figure 7 one can visually see that the change in
volatility on meeting days is larger than minutes days in subsample 1, for SPY.
Table 7: T-test results comparing volatility on minutes release days with statement release days.
Security and Year Ha : µVol,Meeting,post   µVol, Meeting,pre 6= µVol, Minutes,post   µVol, Minutes,pre T-statistic P-value
SPY, overall Yes 1.9504 0.0525 *
BIL, overall No -0.10117 0.9195
SPY 2007 No -1.0205 0.3086
BIL 2007 No -1.1168 0.2653
SPY 2008 Yes 1.8196 0.07014 *
BIL 2008 No -0.69707 0.4865
SPY 2009 No 0.27742 0.7817
BIL 2009 No -1.4648 0.1445
SPY 2010 Yes 1.8942 0.05942 *
BIL 2010 No -1.1219 0.2631
SPY 2011 No 1.4004 0.1627
BIL 2011 No 0.42187 0.6735
SPY 2012 No -1.5261 0.1284
BIL 2012 No 1.0165 0.3105
SPY 2013 Yes -2.2718 0.02421 *
BIL 2013 Yes -2.8213 0.00529 *
SPY 2014 No 0.17202 0.8636
BIL 2014 No -1.0113 0.3133
SPY Subsample 1 Yes 2.4292 0.01594 *
BIL Subsample 1 No -1.4007 0.1627
SPY Subsample 2 No -0.37164 0.7105
BIL Subsample 2 No 0.16255 0.871
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Figure 7: Volatility for SPY across subsample 1 (left) and subsample 2 (right)
Red is change in volatility on meeting days, Green is change in volatility on minutes release days
6.7 How good are meeting days and minute release days in predicting the
volatility of SPY?
I group my dataset into 3 categories, days of no meeting and no minutes, days of meeting and no minutes,
and days of minutes and no meetings. There is no category for days of meeting and minutes because they
never occur simultaneously. After calculating the 1-minute standard deviations of each group, I fit the data
according to the linear regression model
Volatility of SPYt =  0 +  1 ⇤Volatility of BILt +  2 ⇤Meetingt +  3 ⇤Minutest + ✏t (2)
where Meeting is an indicator variable that is 1 when the date is a meeting day and 0 otherwise. Similarly,
Minutes is an indicator variable that is 1 when the date is a minutes release day and 0 otherwise. My results
show that throughout the entire sample, the volatility of BIL, the Meeting, and the Minutes are significant
predictors on their own that influence the volatility of SPY. A partial F-test comparing models that include
di↵erent combinations of the above predictors shows that a full model with all the predictors: Volatility of
BIL, Meetings, and Minutes is significant.
I also analyze the quality of meeting days and minutes release days in predicting the volatility of BIL.
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The regression model I use is:
Volatility of BILt =  0 +  1 ⇤Meetingt +  2 ⇤Minutest + ✏t (3)
The variables Meeting and Minutes are similarly defined. Here, I find that throughout the entire sample,
the volatility of BIL is highly impacted by the meeting and the minutes. Since the statement is released on
the meeting day, the statement itself is more a significant predictor than the minutes. This indicates that
the statements does a good job of clearly announcing the federal funds rate throughout the sample, and the
minutes, although helpful, is additional delayed information that is somewhat less important. A partial F
test shows that the most significant model using these predictors is the model that includes just the Meetings
variable.
As a side note, the overall adjusted R2 of the model is very low, indicating that still more of the variability
of SPY and BIL must be explained by other factors. The full regression output and partial F test results
can be found in Item 8 of the Appendix.
6.8 How do volatility patterns change from the financial crisis years to the
recovery years?
Here I summarize the statistics on subsamples presented in earlier samples to form a theory of how average
volatility patterns in SPY and BIL change from crisis to recovery years.
In Section 6.2 one can see that, when measured on the subsample level, average volatility on FOMC
meeting days in the crisis years significantly di↵ers from average volatility in control days for SPY in the
recovery years but is not significantly di↵erent for BIL in either of the two phases. In the crisis years,
average volatility is significantly higher on control days, while in the recovery years, average volatility is
significantly lower on control days. This is most likely due to large market disruptions during the crisis years
but relatively calmer markets during the control years that caused FOMC meetings to rise in prominence.
For BIL, volatility levels remain indistinguishable between meeting and control days for the crisis years, but
calmed considerably during the recovery years as the FOMC adopted a strongly dovish stance to stimulate
economic recovery.
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In Section 6.3, one sees that the change in volatility on the meetings days was significantly di↵erent than
the change in volatility on control days for equities throughout both subsamples, but does not seem to have
the similar e↵ect on the federal funds market. During the crisis years, the result in the equities market would
be likely due to prices moving around investor reactions to emergency FOMC actions designed to provide
liquidity and stability in the economic system in the short term. Then, as the economy recovered, investors
looked to the FOMC for how these policies were going to ”taper”, or end. Another factor in the significant
reaction of SPY during the recovery years is that the equity market is influenced by factors other than
the federal funds rate, and investors of SPY read the statements for other information as well, such as the
Fed’s outlook on the economy and its commentary on the European debt crisis. A more subtle observation
indicates that the FOMC statements got more significant after the crisis. This is expected because during
the crisis years, the FOMC’s economic outlook was just one of many influential economic events they had to
react to, but as the crisis subsided, there were less disruptive events that were as influential as the release of
the FOMC statements, leading to an increased importance placed on meeting days. For BIL, one can deduce
markets expecting, in general, near zero interest rates throughout the crisis years. The clearly accomodative
policy taken in the years after the crisis subdued much of the volatility in the federal funds markets even as
the economy recovered.
In Section 6.4, the subdued e↵ect of FOMC meetings during crisis years in minutes data is again observed.
In the crisis years, minutes information seems to not a↵ect volatility significantly, mostly due to to the delayed
information not having much use when market conditions are rapidly changing. In fact, for BIL the markets
are observed as having completely anticipated the information released in the minutes, so that release days
actually experience significantly lower volatility than control days. However, as the markets became calmer
in the recovery years, equities market participants were observed to be able to gain more detailed information
on the FOMC economic outlook through the FOMC minutes as volatility on minutes release days became
significantly higher than on control days. Also, BIL market participants were mostly assured, by the strong
dovish policies, that the federal funds rate would not fluctuate by much in the short term, even in the calmer
markets of the remainder months of the sample period, illustrated by the observation that average volatility
levels were indistinguishable between meeting and control days in the recovery subsample.
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In Section 6.5 it is noted that, consistent with past results, the change in intraday volatility levels from
before 2PM to after 2PM on minutes release days and control days was not significantly di↵erent for BIL
during the crisis years, since the statement clearly conveys this rate in both subsamples. However for SPY,
in both subsamples it is evident that the release of the minutes does significantly influence intraday volatility
levels. The trend appears to grow in significance in the second subsample, indicating that the minutes tend
to be more influential in intraday volatility in a calmer market.
In Section 6.6, I compare the change in volatility on minutes release days with that of the meeting days,
to see which event was more influential. I found that the change in intraday volatility levels on meeting days
is significantly higher than the change in intraday volatility levels on minutes days for the overall sample in
SPY, and this trend is mainly supported by the first subsample, not the second. For BIL, the two events
seem to induce almost the same levels of intraday volatility. A theory on why this is occurring may be that
during the crisis, market disrupting events occurred so frequently that the minutes, released with a three
week lag, contained information that was no longer relevant. Investors must rely only on the statements to
make their best judgment. However, as the economy recovered, the data shows the minutes beginning to
gain more importance, as markets stablized and influential, unexpected events happened less frequently. So
in a more normal economy, markets were able to make some use of the additional information of the detailed
economic outlook in the minutes.
7 Conclusion
After answering the questions above, one can see that the results are quite di↵erent from what the
existing literature concluded about earlier samples. In the tumultuous 8 years of the sample, the financial
crisis challenged the FOMC to help the economy in experimental new ways, such as long periods of zero
interest rates and using alternative monetary policies like quantitative easing. It is also clear that changing
volatility trends reflect the change in the role of communications as monetary policy evolved.
In summary, Section 6.2 shows that, through the entire sample, the volatility on meeting days is higher
than on control days. However, the annual trends show two distinct trends between the crisis and recovery
years. For the equities market, volatility is observed to be higher on normal (control) days during the crisis
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years, while in the recovery years, meeting day volatility becomes significantly higher than control days.
Section 6.3 shows that, through the entire sample, the change in volatility before and after the common
2PM release time on meeting days is larger than the change in volatility before and after the 2PM release
time on control days for both the equities and fed funds markets. Section 6.4 shows that average volatility
on minutes release days is indistinguishable from volatility on control days for SPY, and average volatility
on minutes release days is significantly less than control days for BIL when considering the whole sample.
However, looking at the subsample results, I note that minutes release day volatility can be more prominently
observed as markets recovered from the crisis. Section 6.5 shows that, through the entire sample, the change
in volatility before and after the common 2PM release time on minutes release days is larger than the change
in volatility before and after the 2PM release time on control days for the equities market, while for the
federal funds market, the release of the minutes has an indistinguishable e↵ect. Section 6.6 shows that the
change in volatility on meetings days is higher than the change in volatility on minutes-release days during
the peak years of the crisis for the equities market, but this trend subsided during the recovery period,
largely because both releases were important in di↵erent ways, and the time lag of the minutes was less of
an issue. Section 6.7 shows that meetings and minutes are important variables that explain variability in
SPY and BIL. Section 6.8 provides a summary of the evolution of volatility trends as the economy moved
from a state of crisis to gradual recovery.
Statistically, my results are strongest at the overall sample and are not as strong when I analyze according
to smaller timeframes, such as over each individual year. This is due to having less observations in each
dataset, which allow for random variations to have more influence on my results.
There is room for additional analysis. Further ideas to investigate include investigating if dovish or
hawkish statements influences volatility in di↵erent ways. Future researchers can also evaluate additional
regressors in the volatility model by analyzing other types of Fed communications releases, and other security
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9 Appendix
Item 1
Jarque-Bera statistics showing that returns for SPY are not normally distributed (very low p-value).
> jb.norm.test(MasterData12to4PM_2$RET.SPY)
Jarque-Bera test for normality
data: MasterData12to4PM_2$RET.SPY
JB = 316640000, p-value < 2.2e-16
Jarque-Bera statistics showing that returns for BIL are not normally distributed (very low p-value).
> jb.norm.test(MasterData12to4PM_2$RET.BIL)
Jarque-Bera test for normality
data: MasterData12to4PM_2$RET.BIL
JB = 167400000, p-value < 2.2e-16
Summary returns for SPY and BIL, without outliers.
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> summary(MasterData12to4PM$RET.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-1.399e-03 -1.689e-04 1.702e-07 4.518e-06 1.779e-04 1.400e-03
> summary(MasterData12to4PM$RET.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-3.095e-04 -4.362e-05 0.000e+00 -7.788e-08 4.363e-05 3.098e-04
Item 2
Output for T-test of Di↵erence in Average Volatility on Meeting Days vs Control Days For
SPY, Overall Sample
> t.test(meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY, control_meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY and control_meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 3.5124, df = 317.72, p-value = 0.0005085
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
9.603831e-06 3.406479e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003836090 0.0003617747
For BIL, Overall Sample
> t.test(meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL, control_meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL and control_meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -5.6044, df = 275.37, p-value = 5.07e-08
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0








Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2007$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2007$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -3.4499, df = 319.09, p-value = 0.0006363
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-6.752542e-05 -1.847828e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
1.348053e-05 5.648237e-05
> t.test(meetings_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.3304, df = 444.99, p-value = 0.1841
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-9.386841e-06 1.808435e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
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data: meetings_sd_2008$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2008$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -8.3953, df = 474.68, p-value = 5.394e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.0002958216 -0.0001836082
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0002648793 0.0005045942
> t.test(meetings_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -8.1605, df = 478, p-value = 2.978e-15
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-6.163733e-05 -3.771471e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2009$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2009$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -2.9205, df = 406.15, p-value = 0.003689
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-7.684670e-05 -1.501429e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.5312, df = 375.32, p-value = 0.1266
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.125383e-05 1.400055e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2010$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2010$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -1.7819, df = 395.96, p-value = 0.07553
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-5.976571e-05 2.934934e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003119683 0.0003403836
> t.test(meetings_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -3.4959, df = 418.62, p-value = 0.0005229
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0








Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2011$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2011$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 3.139, df = 416.87, p-value = 0.001816
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
1.660802e-05 7.225327e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0004511471 0.0004067165
> t.test(meetings_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.78931, df = 387.27, p-value = 0.4304
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-8.809213e-06 3.762287e-06
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2012$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2012$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 5.1657, df = 386.64, p-value = 3.844e-07
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
3.439318e-05 7.666154e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003018786 0.0002463512
> t.test(meetings_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -4.4666, df = 395.21, p-value = 1.039e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.712361e-05 -6.656684e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2013$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2013$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 4.1138, df = 381.37, p-value = 4.771e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0




mean of x mean of y
0.0002517569 0.0002153941
> t.test(meetings_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -5.043, df = 462.21, p-value = 6.594e-07
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.573478e-05 -6.910562e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2014$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_2014$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 6.5477, df = 351.02, p-value = 2.077e-10
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
4.632595e-05 8.610384e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003143368 0.0002481219
> t.test(meetings_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -3.5361, df = 405.66, p-value = 0.000453
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
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95 percent confidence interval:
-1.241103e-05 -3.542121e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_meetings_subsample_1$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -1.8609, df = 397.98, p-value = 0.06349
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4.161294e-05 1.141884e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0004503169 0.0004705524
> t.test(meetings_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_meetings_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_meetings_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.8394, df = 406.2, p-value = 0.4017
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-5.758983e-06 2.312482e-06
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.SPY and control_sd_meetings_subsample_2$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 7.6059, df = 405.96, p-value = 1.988e-13
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
3.809378e-05 6.464841e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003447216 0.0002933505
> t.test(meetings_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL, control_sd_meetings_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL and control_sd_meetings_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -4.6791, df = 444.44, p-value = 3.831e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-7.892644e-06 -3.223587e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001006855 0.0001062436
Item 3
Summary statistics of volatility over meeting and control days for the years of the sample
Over the entire sample 2007-2014
> summary(meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0001806 0.0003140 0.0003841 0.0003836 0.0004530 0.0005852
> summary(control_meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
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0.0002948 0.0003356 0.0003538 0.0003618 0.0003844 0.0005082
> summary(meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
5.970e-05 9.781e-05 1.066e-04 1.053e-04 1.139e-04 1.342e-04
> summary(control_meetings_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0000989 0.0001075 0.0001100 0.0001100 0.0001124 0.0001181
2007
> summary(meetings_sd_2007$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.00000 0.00007 0.00016 0.00020 0.00032 0.00087
> summary(control_sd_2007$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.00000 0.00019 0.00028 0.00041 0.00059 0.00121
> summary(meetings_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.00000 0.00000 0.00009 0.00008 0.00015 0.00016
> summary(control_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.00000 0.00000 0.00005 0.00007 0.00012 0.00027
2008
> summary(meetings_sd_2008$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.00002 0.00024 0.00043 0.00048 0.00071 0.00140
> summary(control_sd_2008$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000046 0.000370 0.000569 0.000556 0.000730 0.001319
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> summary(meetings_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.00000 0.00002 0.00010 0.00009 0.00013 0.00027
> summary(control_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000000 0.000072 0.000116 0.000107 0.000148 0.000256
2009
> summary(meetings_sd_2009$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000000 0.000299 0.000431 0.000444 0.000590 0.001079
> summary(control_sd_2009$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0001850 0.0003820 0.0004749 0.0004785 0.0005766 0.0008754
> summary(meetings_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000000 0.000093 0.000118 0.000115 0.000143 0.000189
> summary(control_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.




Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000000 0.000167 0.000299 0.000334 0.000476 0.000911
> summary(control_sd_2010$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
2.964e-06 2.467e-04 3.373e-04 3.404e-04 4.272e-04 6.738e-04
> summary(meetings_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000001 0.000072 0.000102 0.000100 0.000129 0.000218
> summary(control_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
4.370e-09 8.629e-05 1.080e-04 1.072e-04 1.275e-04 2.073e-04
2011
> summary(meetings_sd_2011$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0000348 0.0003253 0.0004489 0.0004530 0.0005715 0.0011080
> summary(control_sd_2011$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
4.111e-05 3.072e-04 4.215e-04 4.067e-04 4.979e-04 7.195e-04
> summary(meetings_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0000000 0.0000808 0.0001051 0.0001034 0.0001321 0.0002160
> summary(control_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.




Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
5.564e-05 2.026e-04 2.729e-04 3.019e-04 3.921e-04 9.243e-04
> summary(control_sd_2012$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0001010 0.0001798 0.0002327 0.0002464 0.0002873 0.0006266
> summary(meetings_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.000e+00 5.884e-05 8.616e-05 8.248e-05 1.092e-04 1.722e-04
> summary(control_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
2.829e-05 8.060e-05 9.499e-05 9.437e-05 1.084e-04 1.472e-04
2013
> summary(meetings_sd_2013$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
3.025e-05 1.568e-04 2.243e-04 2.518e-04 3.216e-04 6.658e-04
> summary(control_sd_2013$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
6.537e-05 1.717e-04 2.027e-04 2.154e-04 2.525e-04 4.405e-04
> summary(meetings_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
4.631e-06 7.259e-05 9.194e-05 9.011e-05 1.086e-04 1.456e-04
> summary(control_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.




Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
4.985e-05 2.049e-04 2.926e-04 3.143e-04 4.136e-04 7.538e-04
> summary(control_sd_2014$STD.DEV.SPY)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
8.258e-05 1.989e-04 2.418e-04 2.481e-04 2.900e-04 4.850e-04
> summary(meetings_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1.874e-08 8.692e-05 1.071e-04 1.049e-04 1.253e-04 1.948e-04
> summary(control_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
5.656e-05 1.016e-04 1.128e-04 1.129e-04 1.258e-04 1.729e-04
Item 4





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 11.009, df = 150.97, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
0.0000722081 0.0001037975
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
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0.0001384545 0.0000504517
> t.test(meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
control_meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 2.5903, df = 137.23, p-value = 0.01062
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
9.829519e-07 7.325487e-06
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -0.91316, df = 156.89, p-value = 0.3626
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-7.490958e-05 2.754405e-05
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.4972, df = 221.3, p-value = 0.1358
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.018860e-05 2.756702e-06
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -0.053723, df = 231.57, p-value = 0.9572
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.0001172342 0.0001110107
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
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t = -1.0226, df = 237.88, p-value = 0.3075
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.410297e-05 1.079561e-05
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 4.1361, df = 216.1, p-value = 5.058e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
6.085218e-05 1.716459e-04
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.61497, df = 187.64, p-value = 0.5393
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0









Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 4.8756, df = 206.75, p-value = 2.16e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
8.520983e-05 2.009037e-04
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 1.1103, df = 211.36, p-value = 0.2681
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-6.820472e-06 2.441096e-05
sample estimates:






Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 2.0836, df = 198.2, p-value = 0.03848
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
3.136467e-06 1.139697e-04
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 0.11165, df = 196.96, p-value = 0.9112
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.188624e-05 1.331288e-05
sample estimates:






Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 0.86362, df = 191.44, p-value = 0.3889
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.456612e-05 6.283392e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
5.76952e-05 3.85613e-05
> t.test(meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
control_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 3.7409, df = 196.9, p-value = 0.0002404
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
9.570594e-06 3.091153e-05
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
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data: meetings_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 8.7514, df = 219.34, p-value = 5.683e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
9.854454e-05 1.558306e-04
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.39849, df = 234.22, p-value = 0.6906
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.046876e-05 6.946341e-06
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 5.7265, df = 179.43, p-value = 4.244e-08
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alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
6.295164e-05 1.291463e-04
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.4089, df = 209.16, p-value = 0.1604
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.465254e-05 2.438404e-06
sample estimates:






Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_meetings_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY -
control_sd_meetings_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 6.4516, df = 213.22, p-value = 7.318e-10
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
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95 percent confidence interval:
8.097763e-05 1.522298e-04
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_meetings_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL -
control_sd_meetings_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.50125, df = 204.03, p-value = 0.6167
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-9.741680e-06 5.792449e-06
sample estimates:






Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_sd_meetings_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY -
control_sd_meetings_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 6.1498, df = 201.61, p-value = 4.096e-09
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alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
4.532169e-05 8.810045e-05
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_sd_meetings_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL -
control_sd_meetings_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 0.079691, df = 226.73, p-value = 0.9366
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4.497637e-06 4.876758e-06
sample estimates:




Output for T-test of Di↵erence in Average Volatility on minutes release days and control days
For the entire sample
> t.test(minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY, control_minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 0.49365, df = 390.47, p-value = 0.6218
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.164731e-05 1.945716e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003726875 0.0003687826
> t.test(minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_overall$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -3.4309, df = 424.66, p-value = 0.0006604
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-7.050193e-06 -1.914410e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -1.178, df = 419.43, p-value = 0.2395
67
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4.025642e-05 1.008601e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0004334655 0.0004485507
> t.test(minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -4.8112, df = 398.1, p-value = 2.133e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.964416e-05 -8.247232e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 1.6985, df = 394.07, p-value = 0.0902
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.294814e-06 3.143535e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.8781, df = 425.94, p-value = 0.3804
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4.701114e-06 1.797764e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2007$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2007$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -0.9502, df = 477.32, p-value = 0.3425
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.675741e-05 9.314083e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
1.497751e-05 2.369917e-05
> t.test(minutes_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2007$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.93478, df = 471.22, p-value = 0.3504
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0








Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2008$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2008$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -9.0393, df = 452.05, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.0003186334 -0.0002048283
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001337798 0.0003955107
> t.test(minutes_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2008$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -8.7278, df = 421.5, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-5.948928e-05 -3.761930e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2009$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2009$STD.DEV.SPY
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t = -3.4987, df = 437.54, p-value = 0.0005155
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.213720e-04 -3.405802e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0003765238 0.0004542388
> t.test(minutes_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2009$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -6.8796, df = 441.32, p-value = 2.065e-11
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4.367705e-05 -2.426689e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2010$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2010$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -3.1925, df = 439.77, p-value = 0.001512
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-8.676873e-05 -2.064315e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2010$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -4.8778, df = 448.26, p-value = 1.493e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.403272e-05 -1.448493e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2011$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2011$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -6.1551, df = 436.98, p-value = 1.7e-09
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.365293e-04 -7.044069e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0002739437 0.0003774288
> t.test(minutes_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2011$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -4.9408, df = 427.76, p-value = 1.118e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0








Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2012$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2012$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 4.128, df = 420.46, p-value = 4.415e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
3.124016e-05 8.803559e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0002910815 0.0002314436
> t.test(minutes_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2012$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -3.7377, df = 468.98, p-value = 0.0002086
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.233421e-05 -6.942545e-06
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
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data: minutes_sd_2013$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2013$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 1.8905, df = 371.8, p-value = 0.05947
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.089711e-06 5.539685e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0002394607 0.0002123071
> t.test(minutes_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL, control_minutes_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2013$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -6.541, df = 459.09, p-value = 1.633e-10
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.469984e-05 -1.866662e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2014$STD.DEV.SPY and control_minutes_sd_2014$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -4.391, df = 458.54, p-value = 1.402e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-8.078033e-05 -3.083017e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL and control_minutes_sd_2014$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 1.7407, df = 374.69, p-value = 0.08255
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-9.842420e-07 1.617269e-05
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.SPY and minutes_control_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -1.1853, df = 409.1, p-value = 0.8817
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.543006e-05 Inf
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL and minutes_control_sd_subsample_1$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.5788, df = 446.96, p-value = 0.9425
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alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-8.244359e-06 Inf
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.SPY and minutes_control_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 3.7672, df = 417.89, p-value = 9.439e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than 0
95 percent confidence interval:
1.335481e-05 Inf
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL and minutes_control_sd_subsample_2$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.98363, df = 421.55, p-value = 0.8371
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.433732e-06 Inf
sample estimates:




Output for T-test of di↵erence in average volatility before and after 2PM on meeting days vs
control days
For the entire sample:
> t.test(minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY- minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
control_minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - control_minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 4.8414, df = 195.87, p-value = 2.611e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
3.890447e-05 9.238603e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - control_minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 1.3447, df = 225.92, p-value = 0.1801
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.605099e-06 8.502390e-06
sample estimates:







Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY -
control_minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 2.7232, df = 211.51, p-value = 0.007006
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
1.844744e-05 1.151699e-04
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL -
control_minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 1.09, df = 211.44, p-value = 0.2769
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0










Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
control_minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY -
control_minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 5.5824, df = 211.16, p-value = 7.241e-08
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
5.135463e-05 1.074227e-04
sample estimates:





Welch Two Sample t-test
data: minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
control_minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL -
control_minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 1.204, df = 215.46, p-value = 0.2299
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0




mean of x mean of y
4.975856e-06 9.184863e-07
Item 8
Output for T-tests of di↵erence in average volatility between minutes release days and meeting
days
For the entire sample:
> t.test(meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY- meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 1.9504, df = 203.65, p-value = 0.0525
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.937821e-07 5.417237e-05
sample estimates:




Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_overall_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_overall_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.10117, df = 223.14, p-value = 0.9195
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0




mean of x mean of y
3.680255e-06 3.936938e-06
For 2007
> t.test(meetings_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -1.0205, df = 218.6, p-value = 0.3086
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4.908315e-05 1.559358e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
6.714115e-06 2.345890e-05
> t.test(meetings_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2007_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2007_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.1168, df = 231.77, p-value = 0.2653
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.418585e-05 3.922108e-06
sample estimates:




> t.test(meetings_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 1.8196, df = 227.81, p-value = 0.07014
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-8.575276e-06 2.154237e-04
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
9.986080e-05 -3.563424e-06
> t.test(meetings_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2008_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2008_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -0.69707, df = 225.54, p-value = 0.4865
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.765784e-05 1.320333e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
-1.112828e-06 6.114430e-06
For 2009
> t.test(meetings_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
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Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 0.27742, df = 211.55, p-value = 0.7817
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-6.798823e-05 9.025851e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001817974 0.0001706622
> t.test(meetings_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2009_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2009_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.4648, df = 201.09, p-value = 0.1445
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.302754e-05 4.873313e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
8.536722e-07 1.493079e-05
For 2010
> t.test(meetings_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
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t = 1.8942, df = 236.78, p-value = 0.05942
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.722351e-06 1.386780e-04
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0002116593 0.0001436815
> t.test(meetings_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2010_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2010_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.1219, df = 229.86, p-value = 0.2631
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.164787e-05 8.684049e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
3.467848e-06 1.494976e-05
For 2011
> t.test(meetings_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 1.4004, df = 236.85, p-value = 0.1627
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0




mean of x mean of y
1.313703e-04 8.227308e-05
> t.test(meetings_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2011_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2011_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 0.42187, df = 223.85, p-value = 0.6735
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.380203e-05 2.132115e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
7.873099e-06 4.113537e-06
For 2012
> t.test(meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -1.5261, df = 226.4, p-value = 0.1284
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.076211e-04 1.367881e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
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0.0000576952 0.0001046663
> t.test(meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2012_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2012_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 1.0165, df = 226.96, p-value = 0.3105
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-7.056677e-06 2.209558e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
2.332044e-05 1.580099e-05
For 2013
> t.test(meetings_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -2.2718, df = 191.03, p-value = 0.02421
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-9.873723e-05 -6.963951e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001585191 0.0002113697
> t.test(meetings_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
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Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2013_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2013_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -2.8213, df = 190.65, p-value = 0.00529
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.175660e-05 -5.622735e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
3.994494e-06 2.268416e-05
For 2014
> t.test(meetings_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 0.17202, df = 235.83, p-value = 0.8636
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.975927e-05 4.736676e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001355974 0.0001317936
> t.test(meetings_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_2014_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_2014_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
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t = -1.0113, df = 168.59, p-value = 0.3133
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.531594e-05 8.164686e-06
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
9.315326e-07 9.507161e-06
For Subsample 1
> t.test(meetings_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = 2.4292, df = 218.25, p-value = 0.01594
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
1.147133e-05 1.101313e-04
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001786932 0.0001178919
> t.test(meetings_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_subsample_1_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_subsample_1_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = -1.4007, df = 218.32, p-value = 0.1627
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0




mean of x mean of y
-1.517160e-06 6.309947e-06
For Subsample 2
> t.test(meetings_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY,
minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY - meetings_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY and
minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.SPY - minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.SPY
t = -0.37164, df = 224.9, p-value = 0.7105
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-3.482004e-05 2.377014e-05
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.0001169841 0.0001225090
> t.test(meetings_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL,
minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL)
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meetings_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL - meetings_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL and
minutes_sd_subsample_2_post$STD.DEV.BIL - minutes_sd_subsample_2_pre$STD.DEV.BIL
t = 0.16255, df = 209.41, p-value = 0.871
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-5.992182e-06 7.069183e-06
sample estimates:




Regression results on the quality of Meeting and Minutes as predictors
Overall sample, for volatility of SPY
Overall_sd <- MasterData12to4PM %>% group_by(HOUR, MINUTE, Meeting, Minutes) %>%
summarise(STD.DEV.SPY = sd(RET.SPY), STD.DEV.BIL = sd(RET.BIL))
> summary(lm(STD.DEV.SPY~STD.DEV.BIL+Meeting+Minutes, data=Overall_sd))
Call:
lm(formula = STD.DEV.SPY ~ STD.DEV.BIL + Meeting + Minutes, data = Overall_sd)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.110e-04 -4.478e-05 -5.600e-06 4.990e-05 4.088e-04
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.065e-04 2.834e-05 10.814 < 2e-16 ***
STD.DEV.BIL 4.955e-01 2.530e-01 1.958 0.05059 .
Meeting 2.495e-05 7.596e-06 3.284 0.00107 **
Minutes 1.352e-05 7.560e-06 1.788 0.07425 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 8.219e-05 on 716 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.01774, Adjusted R-squared: 0.01362
F-statistic: 4.309 on 3 and 716 DF, p-value: 0.005038
Overall sample, for volatility of BIL
> summary(lm(STD.DEV.BIL~Meeting+Minutes, data=Overall_sd))
Call:
lm(formula = STD.DEV.BIL ~ Meeting + Minutes, data = Overall_sd)
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Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-5.528e-05 -4.927e-06 4.490e-07 6.174e-06 4.301e-05
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.100e-04 7.831e-07 140.515 < 2e-16 ***
Meeting -4.703e-06 1.107e-06 -4.247 2.46e-05 ***
Minutes -3.665e-06 1.107e-06 -3.309 0.000982 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 1.213e-05 on 717 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.02702, Adjusted R-squared: 0.0243






Analysis of Variance Table
Model 1: Overall_sd$STD.DEV.SPY ~ Overall_sd$STD.DEV.BIL
Model 2: Overall_sd$STD.DEV.SPY ~ Overall_sd$STD.DEV.BIL + Overall_sd$Meeting
Model 3: Overall_sd$STD.DEV.SPY ~ Overall_sd$STD.DEV.BIL + Overall_sd$Meeting + Overall_sd$Minutes
Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
1 718 4.9095e-06
2 717 4.8581e-06 1 5.1403e-08 7.6097 0.005954 **
3 716 4.8365e-06 1 2.1588e-08 3.1959 0.074248 .
---





Analysis of Variance Table
Model 1: Overall_sd$STD.DEV.BIL ~ Overall_sd$Minutes
Model 2: Overall_sd$STD.DEV.BIL ~ Overall_sd$Meeting + Overall_sd$Minutes
Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
1 718 1.0817e-07
2 717 1.0552e-07 1 2.6541e-09 18.035 2.455e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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